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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3322 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL RAY TURNEY, 
                                                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel.  
SECRETARY OF LABOR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00113) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 4, 2012 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Filed: October 22, 2012 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER 
 Michael Turney, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the District 
Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, 
we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court.  
CURIAM 
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I. 
 Turney was an employee of the Department of Energy and suffered two work-
related injuries in 1993 and in 1995.  Turney thereafter received benefits from the 
Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”).  In 
March 2003, Turney pled guilty to a felony and is currently incarcerated at  Federal 
Correctional Institute Loretto (“FCI Loretto”).  Following Turney’s incarceration, the 
OWCP suspended benefit payments to Turney pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8148(b)(1), which 
prohibits persons convicted of felonies from collecting compensation benefits while 
incarcerated.  
 In May 2011, Turney initiated the underlying action in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Turney styled his complaint as an action 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1977), and named as a defendant “Attorney General Eric Holder for the Secretary of 
Labor for the OWCP.”  Turney individually served U.S. Attorney General Holder and 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis with notice of process.1
                                              
1 It was unclear which parties were properly defendants in Turney’s complaint.  Attorney 
General Holder responded to the complaint and primarily addressed claims made against 
the Bureau of Prisons, although the response did briefly address claims made against the 
Department of Labor.  However, in his reply Turney stated that the Department of Labor 
“is the actual defendant not the Bureau of Prisons,” and “[t]his complaint is not against 
the B.O.P.”  Nevertheless, Turney’s reply contained allegations against officials at FCI 
Loretto acting “[t]hrough the attorney general.”  Consequently, construing Turney’s 
complaint liberally and affording him the allowances due a pro se litigant, we will 
address, to the extent they are made, any claims raised against Attorney General Holder 
through his control and regulation of the Bureau of Prisons and claims raised against 
Secretary Solis through her control and regulation of the OWCP.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
   
3 
 
Construed liberally, see United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Haines v. Kishner
Turney contended that the OWCP’s failure to reimburse him for his medical 
expenses was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Turney complained that FCI Loretto officials required him to pay for medical treatment 
for chronic symptoms related to injuries he sustained as a federal employee, injuries his 
workers’ compensation benefits should have covered.  The complaint asserted that the 
OWCP’s failure to verify that the BOP provided sufficient free care for Turney and to 
provide benefits so that he could purchase necessary care that was not freely provided 
violated his Eighth Amendment rights.   
, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the complaint alleged that Attorney 
General Holder, through his control and regulation of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), 
violated Turney’s Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of medical services and 
necessary hygiene products, thereby subjecting him to “unwanton vindictive pain and 
suffering” through “deliberate indifference.”  Turney contended that policies at FCI 
Loretto deprived him of necessary medical and psychiatric services because he was 
charged a $2.00 co-pay for appointments and was required to purchase “life necessities” 
and hygiene products, none of which he could readily afford.  Additionally, Turney 
contended that his request for a consultation with a community psychiatrist was denied.  
Turney also stated that his treatment at FCI Loretto was retaliation from Attorney 
General Holder due to prior litigation against the Department of Justice, including 
Federal Employee Compensation Act claims and a whistleblower’s case.  
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Attorney General Holder filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  He argued that the complaint should be dismissed because 
Turney failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against the BOP; failed to show 
Attorney General Holder was personally responsible for any of the alleged conduct; and, 
to the extent that the complaint challenged the OWCP’s suspension of Turney’s benefits, 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review the suspension.  Turney’s reply contained 
further allegations against the BOP, namely, that he received inadequate emergency care 
resulting in a deformed finger and that Attorney General Holder, via a “special 
administrative measure,” restricted Turney’s medical care to “in house treatment only.”   
The Magistrate Judge treated the complaint as “a straightforward mandamus 
action against the Secretary of Labor”; noted that the suspension of Turney’s benefits was 
done pursuant to constitutional legislation, 5 U.S.C. § 8148(b)(1); and recommended that 
the complaint be dismissed.  The District Court did so over Turney’s objections, and 
Turney now appeals.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may affirm 
on any grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 121 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Our review of the District Court’s grant of the motion to dismiss is de novo.  
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  In order to survive 
dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
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defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A claim is 
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  
We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial questions.  See
III. 
 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 A.  Bivens
 A 
 Action Against Attorney General Holder 
Bivens claim cannot rely on the theory of respondeat superior; that is, in a 
Bivens action “masters do not answer for the torts of their servants.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
675-77 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A party may establish liability for deprivation 
of a constitutional right only through a showing of personal involvement by each 
defendant.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Personal 
involvement may be shown through personal direction, actual participation in the alleged 
misconduct, or knowledge of and acquiescence in the alleged misconduct.  Id.
In this case, insofar as Turney named Attorney General Holder as a defendant, he 
did not allege that Attorney General Holder was personally involved in the alleged 
denials of medical care and hygiene products.  Although Turney made broad allegations 
that the treatment he described was retaliation from Attorney General Holder due to 
Turney’s previous litigation against the Department of Justice, we need not accept these 
general assertions as true.  
  
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating that in a pleading bare 
assertions, unsupported by facts, are insufficient).  We look to the factual allegations 
Turney presented in support of his legal conclusions.  See id. at 679.  On review, we 
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conclude that his allegations against Attorney General Holder, lacking in specificity, are 
not plausible.  Even construing Turney’s pleadings liberally, as we must, they do not 
allow us to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, which does not indicate 
that he is entitled to relief.  See id.  Simply, the facts pled are consistent with Attorney 
General Holder directing Turney’s treatment and care, but are compatible with, and more 
likely explained by, the local officials at FCI Loretto directing Turney’s treatment and 
care.2  See id.
 B.  
 at 680.  Without evidence of personal involvement or knowledge of 
Turney’s treatment, the claim against Attorney General Holder cannot survive.  
Bivens
 Turney’s allegations against Secretary Solis likewise fail because they rely on 
respondeat superior.  
 Action Against Secretary Solis 
Id. at 675-77.  As with his claim against Attorney General Holder, 
Turney must show that Secretary Solis had personal involvement in the alleged 
misconduct.  Rode
                                              
2 To the extent that Turney’s complaint is actually seeking relief from FCI Loretto 
officials or the BOP, the District Court did not err in declining Turney leave to amend his 
complaint.  Any amendment that named the proper parties would be futile because 
Attorney General Holder pled, and Turney conceded, that Turney did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies against FCI Loretto officials and the BOP. See Jones v. Bock, 
549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (noting that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997(e), exhaustion is mandatory and unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court). 
, 845 F.2d at 1207.  Turney did not allege that Secretary Solis was 
personally involved in or had knowledge of the suspension of his workers’ compensation 
benefits.  Without evidence of personal involvement or knowledge of the denied requests, 
Turney’s claims against Secretary Solis fail.  
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IV. 
 Although we are not convinced that Turney’s filing was a petition for a writ of 
mandamus, to the extent that Turney sought a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary Solis 
to reinstate his workers’ compensation benefits, we agree with the District Court that one 
was unwarranted.  Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in extraordinary 
circumstances only.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 373, 378 (3d. Cir. 
2005).  A plaintiff seeking a writ of mandamus must show that he has (1) no other 
adequate means to attain the relief desired and (2) a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ he seeks.  In re Nwanze
V. 
, 242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001).  Turney’s benefits were 
suspended pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8148(b)(1).  That statute explicitly prohibits payment of 
benefits to an individual incarcerated for a felony.  Turney has not shown any right to 
their reinstatement. 
 Turney’s Bivens claims were without merit and he has not shown a right to a writ 
of mandamus.  Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint was correct.  
See Hughes, 242 F.3d at 121 n.1.  As this appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm. 
